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UNDER the Bank iloiding Company Act of1956,
the Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve Systemn
must coimsider the conveniemmce ammd mmeeds of time coin—
nmunity when ruhmmg on apphcatiomms by bank holding
companies to acquire hammk stmbsicharies. 1mm each ease,
tIme Board mnust decide, first, wimetlmer tIme benefits
ascribed by the applicant would be realized and
secommcl, wlmether the proposed acqtmisition would fur—
timer time pmibhc interest.
Jim its past decisiomms, tIme Board has fi)cmmsed 0mm sommme
specific potential effects of holding company aeqimisi—
tiotms imm assessimmg wimetimer time acquisition would fm Er—
timer the conveniemmce ammd mmeeds of the commmmnmmmmity. A
mmmmmmmber of these appearto berelated to standard fimmamm—
cial ratios commmptmted fromrm tIme financial statemmmemmts of
banks. TIme impact of bammk imolding eomnpanies omm tlmese
financial ratios has beemm immx’estigatecl ammcl widely re-
ported imm a imost of bammk perfortrmammee studies. Timims,
although there is no evidemmce timat the Board lmas used
such stmmdies imm reaehimmg its decisions. imammk perfor—
mmmaimce stmmdies could provide tmseftml immfornmation about
hoidimmg eormmpammv aequisitiomm 5
Time primary pmmrpose of tlmis article is to dctermimimme
xx’hether perforimmammee stmmdies aetmiall~-are capaimle of
idemmtifving perfbrmammccchflerenees amommgbanks amid,
imence, whether tiu’~-are relex’aut to policy decisions
about batik holdimmg eomnpanx aeqmmisitions . The first
sectioim briefly reviews the conx-eniemmee ammd needs test
as it relates to imammk acqimisitions ammd its inmpiemrmemmtatiomm
by the Boarci of (Jovermmors . The secommd sectiomm
smmmnmnarizes the results of previous perfi)rmanee stu-
dies. The third sectiomi investigates the commceptualdif-
ficulties with interpreting financial ratios as measures
of bank perfornmanee. The final section draws conclu-
sions about time imnplieations of’perfornmance studies fbr
hotim haimk performance and public policy toward baimk
holding compammies.
THE BOARD ANI) THE
CONVENIENCE ANI) NEEDS TEST
Bammk holding comnpanies mnust apply to time Federal
Reserve Board fhr pc’rmnissiomm to acquire a bank. 1mm
ammaivzimmg tiit, application, the Board mntmst commsider the
effect on the eommvemmienee and needs of time comnmmmunity
ammd must weigim tlmis effect agaimmst ammtieomnpetitix’e
efkcts stemmmmnimmg fronm aim acquisition. Accordimmgto time
presemmt judicial mterpretatiomm of the Bank iloiding
Conmpaimv Act, the Board canmmot apply competitive
standards stricter timamm those in time anti—trust laws (see
box).
The Federai Reserve Board’s treatmmment of eommveni—
emmee ammcl needs in bammk hoiclimmg comnpammy applications
imas been iimx’estigated tlmrouglm exammmimmation of pub—
lislmed Board orders reiatimmg to its various dleeisiomms.
‘Bammlc Uoldimmg CumpammvAct of 1956. mis ammmemmcled_ 12 U. S.C. 18—Il
etsec~.
2Jules Backmmman, ‘1/mm’ Baek I-lob/i rmg Cotimpamm/ Ac:t, Bulleti mm No-
24-25 (New York U-mmiversity, C.J. Dcvi me lmmstitute of Flmmmmmmc:e,
Apm-il—Jmmmme 196.3): ammci NIichael A - Jessc’e amid S ftvemm A - Scelig, “:tmm
Analysis ofti me Pmmlmlme Be,mc ‘fits ‘lest oftIme Bammk Holdlimsg Commmpamm y
Act,” Fedem-ai Reserve Bmmmmk ofNew York Moot/i/p Reciemm- (Jummc
1974). pp 151—62 Timese articles ‘vem’e m-eviewed by ,-\imtlmummy W’.
Cvrmmak - ( om m ‘cm miemmd’e amid Needs -and Pm, lmlic Bemmeli m s i’m iimc’ Bammk
Iiolcling Cmnupamme NIovemmmcmii, ‘‘ iii Time Berm k Ilo/th1mg Conmpomm
Mom:emmmemmt to /975: A Commmpe rid/i mmiii (Board of Ccmvem’mmors cml’ time
Federal Reserve Systemmm, 1978), pp. 263—89. Jessee and Seelig lamer
mpciaiccl I imc’ir stmmclv tIm ‘-mimiglm Jim mit’ 1976: t imeir fi mmdi mmgs- lvi tim respect
tcm tImc’ Boam’ds tm-eatm mmcmit cmfcommvc’ mmiiimmcc ammdl m meedls imm imammk-ac:m I mi si —
tio mm 5, essc mit mmliv were 1mmmcli aimgc’cl fronm timeir cmrigi ma
1
st imci. Scc’
N-Iic:imael A- Jessee mmmci Steveim A - Seeiig. Ba mm A- lb/ri tmg Coin —




S eelmg s tmmclv is mmmom-e reIcvmmmm t imeeaimse its sammmple
period. Jam m mm arv 1971 to mmmicl—I 97-4- pustclmmtes aminemmcl, mmc’mmts 1cm tlmc’
Bammk Iiol dim mg ( Timmm mlmmmmiv Ac:m - Time early I970s Ixas a mwrk mci mifrapid
ham ik Imoldimmg eomsm
1
mmmmmv c’xpamm5 icm mm - Dim m-i mm g iimc’ 1/, ‘cam’s rove rc’cl imy
the Jessee amid Seehg stuck, time Board issmmed om’clem’s apprcmvimmg 434
Imoicli1mg cornpmmm iv appi ieatiomm5 mcs ac:dltore hamiks. ‘aImiic’ 47 rico irmi
orders Il-ere issmmccl )imieludi1mg orders dii vimmg scim mid’ moo—ham mk mc—
quisitid mms)- Comn parmmtiveiy, mmmiv 37 imrcle rs “crc’ issuc’ci clii rimmg
Backmmmamm’s saimmpic’ perimmdl mif 1956—62.
26FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1983
Legal Provisions and Interpretation ofthe Bank
Holding Company Act
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miot gar mm limo ‘mmmgi ii Ici e, ml thc imammk mmacid ‘ mmslis im),mns
11mm mmmtcrist of tlmc Imammk s tdmekbmcmhdier ‘l of dimmi’, sic mmmmcl SrI
‘oim~ m’mm hicause timc iici mr~is II stm’, c mm’, mmdati ms 1cm saic gmi n-cl
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emid st stemmmc mmt tothm cilc ci las mm, ‘nmiac m of tlmc Bo,rd Sc Jc Ce
nm I Sc cii” ‘4mm II Sm of Pimimhme iIm mmefmds Test ‘ p 161
fummction; conseqmmentlv, the bemmefits cited b~’time
Board, at best, are ad hoc ‘approximmmations to time puhhc
imiterest. This is generally the best that can be done
whemm normnativ-e assessmemmts are reqmured.
A separate isstme timat the Board must thee is wimetimer
the effects that it has associated with commveniemmce and
mmeeclswillaetuaiiy result iftime acquisition is ‘approved.
For examnpie, will an acquisitiomm actually ccnmvem’t a
staid bank intc a more aggm’essive lemmcier? Enmpiricai
investigations of tins issue are available in a host of
imank performance studies timat hate examined the
effects of owmmersimip cimi bank opem’atumg characteristics,
Tlmus, in this immstammce, positive studies of bammk operat-
ing cimaracteristics mimight provide sommme useful back-




Performmmance studies have used difl’erent samples
and empiricai approaches. Not surprisimmgly. they oftemm
have attributed differemmt effects to bank holding eomn-
pany owmmership; they are remarkably consistent,
however, in several important ways.
First, the studies have found virtually no diflèremmce
imm financial ratios between indepemident amid bank hold—
ingcOmpammybamiks, prior tothe acquisitiommofthe latter
by hmohding companies.
Secommd, holding conmpanv banks gemmerahhv imohd a
higher proportion cf their assets in loans and the
obhgatiomms of states and municipalities, and a smmm’ailer
proportion in cash amid U.S. governmnemmt securities,
thami conmparahie inciepemidemit bammks.
Third, bammk holding cornpammies gemmeraiiv have mmot
had a sizable efl’ect on time performance measures of
their smmbsidiarv banks. Hoidimmg comnpammy ownership
typicaLly has had a statistically sigmmificanteffect oimonhv
asmall pm’oportion of time fimmammciah ratios inchucied in time
variomms perf’ormmmammce studies. It has mmct been mmear the
top of time list ofthctors that immfluemmce measmmrcs ofbammk
perfornmammce.6 Time simmghe exceptiomm is the studs’ re—
avue amidI Jaekscmm m eamc’im eommmpsmteci beta cciefhiciemmts, “imieli are
jmmtemididnl 1cm immd,as (ire time ,-c’hmtive immmpo rtammec’ mmf timc, imcielmemmclemmt
variables i mm am mmimitipie regrc’ssiomm - Time’- hmitIm estmmmmateci sd’s-c,ral
regcsssiomm eqmmamticiims, so tlmeir results cam, mmmit [mc, so i’m mmmari zedi eommvc’—
mm ic’mmmIx - 1mm mmmos t of timeir regm-essiomms,
9-
mm k hcilchimg c’ommm imammv cmii —
em’slmi
1
m was cmi ‘mm icidli mg om- id’s5cr imnlmom-tammc-e - See Lmmeiite S- N-iavmmd,
--A Ccimmmpamrativc’ Studv of’ Bami k H ciiciimmg (2mm mmmpammv Afimi jades amid
1mmde
1
me mm demmt ilamimks, I 969—1 972, ‘ Journal of Finance 3d areim
1977), [mp 147—58; ammmci Wiiiiammm jamek-scimm, ‘‘Mimitiimammk 1icalcifmmg
Commm
1
mami cci mum 3 Bammic 13cclma’.imir’’ (Wmmi-kimm g Imalmer 75— I , i”ecIem’aI
Rest-’ ‘xe Bammlc mmi’ Rich m mmmmmmci, Jdm I’,- I 975).
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portimmg that holding compammv hamiks are more highly’
leveraged thamm immdependent banks.’
In other respects, time findings have beemm hess commsis—
tent. Them’e is confiictimmg evicheimce on the effects of
holciimmg compaimv ownership 0mm (1) service elmarges on
demnammddeposits and interest rates on time anci savings
deposits, (2) operatnmg expemmses, amid (3) financial
leverage (the ratio of total assets or debt to capital).
Table I summarizes time results ofpc3rformance stmmdies.
ARE BANK PERFOR%lANCE STUDIE:S
ImEL4I4BI I CI~ IDJ S FOR PF Bi i(
POLICY?
Bank perfbrmammee is worth investigating, regardless
of its implications for public policy toward bank hold—
immg c’omnpammy aequisitiomms. Iftime methociology is valid,
bammk performammee studies can imeip economists nuder—
stand how market chmar’actem’isties affect hammk operating
resumits and why hammk imoiding compammies account foran
immereasing share of banking activity. But timese studies
also may indicate the hikeiimcxad timat somne of time bemme—
fits idemmtifiedin previoums Bcarci orders will resuit fm’om
acquisitions of banks imy bank hohdimmg compammies.
Commsider again exhmibit A, the beimefits cited imm pre—
viom,ms Boarci orders approvimmg bammk imohdimmg comnpanv
acqumisitions. Some of these benefits eouici be inca—
smmred by financial ratios: Time level of a specialized
credit service could be represented by time ratio of a
particumlar type of icmaim to the hoaim portfolio. Competi—
tion or the immterest rate on lcaamms ccnmici be represented
by time ratio of immterest revemmue tc time loamm pcartfbhio.
Aggressivemmesscould he nmeasured b time ratio of total
loans to total assets. Economies of scale conich ime mea—
suredi by the ratio ofoperatiimg costs to total assets. The
deht—to—eqtmitv ,‘atio could he comnpnted frommm a hank’s
financial repom’ts~Otimer bemmefits are umnreiated to finamm—
ciai raticas; managenmemmt ‘‘deptim’’ or probhemns ofsmicces—
sion, for exammmphe, eanmmot he mmmeastiredl by any ratio.
The samne fimmammciai ratios that coi.,ldi he umsed tomea-
sure eertaimm prospective benefits of hank imohding conm—
pammy acdiuisitiomms aisci appear imm performance studies as
measures of hammk perfornmammce (see table 1).
Bammk performmmammce studies simare a common metim—
odohogy. Timev compare indepemmciemmt banks’ ammch hank
Mf,mgo fm mmcl that timd’ dlifleremmc-e im mereamsc’d ~m’itim IIme level of mnam-kc’t
eonc-emmtratici im - iii tlmcc macmid higimlv c-ummc-emmtratc’ct lmammki mig ‘mm irked ii,
imis sammmple, time raticm calcapital 1cm icmtai assetsn-as 38 pereemmt Ic;sveriii
imcmIdim mg comimpaov hamm ks cit imdcr factors hd,ici ecmmmstamm t, Tim cc icmwd’
ratio is dcqmIivaiemit tcm higlmccr icc’c’ ,-agcc. S ice Jo1mu J- Mimmgu, ‘‘N-iammagcc—
risml \lc,tives. Market Struem,mrmcs audi the Perfimrmmmammecc cml limmid-
immg Comimpammy Bam,ks, “ Ecmnmoioie Iimqmiirmj (Septemmmher 1976), pp.
-4 11—24,
imolding eommmpammy subsidiaries on time basis of various
financial ratios, eotnpumted from time consohichated re-
ports of i,meome amid condition that all itmsured banks
periodicaiiy file with their regulators. These reports
have standard formats that vary’ ommiv slightly fur large
bammks anch hamaks engaged in certaimm foreign enter-
prises.8 lime same financial raticas, therefore, can be
compared for all insured banks. l’lie perforrnaimce
studies hypothesize timat “good’’ or “bad’’ perfcarnmance
depemmds on time vahies ofthese finammciai ratios. Neitimer
time reiatiommship between perf’ormammce amid time finamm—
cial ratios, ,mor the predicted effects of bank hoichng
conmpanies on time ratios, is derived theoreticaHv. Like
time mmmeasures oftime public interest discussed previous—
iy’, these ratios represent aci hoc mmmeasures of per—
formnammce.
Are timese raticas reliable gmudes to either bammk per—
formmmance or time pubic interest? It seemns not.°First,
ticc empirical approaches emmmpioyed in performnammce
stumdies have variomms shmorteommmimmgs. Second, timese
ratios are distorted by clifferemmces imm accoummtiimg
mmmethoci, organizatiomm’ai strumctmmre and pom’tfolio comn—
positiomm that eammmmot he captured ha’ baiammce sheet and
imicome statenment data; moreover, timey’ are mmotstrictly
commmparabie across immdepemmdemmt banks ammcl imoldiimg
conmpany hammks.
Weakn.esses of Empirical Avproaches
Earlyperfbrmammce studies used’ t—tests of difieremmces
in time mmmeamms to evaluate time effects of imoidimmg coin—
tm
Ttie m-epurtscc,,scahciatmc time’ Ii,mammeiai resimttm cml mm imamik’s mimaimm office,
smmimsidiamrics ammici imrammcclmes (if amp,-) -
iii3auk pem’formnammce studies gccmmc’i-aiiv cud mmot draw pcihev immmpiiea—
ticmmms fm’cmiii timeir fimmdimigs - Altimcimmgim earl’.- stmmciies mimade c’xpIjUt
rc’lem’emmee do time staimmtcmry ecimmvccmmiemmec and mmeedis test, timeir ecmmm—
dim simmu s gccmmeraily were iimimited mc; cli seussions of Imank imerfkmr~
umammee - Later siimchccs did mmcmt refer to tlmcc eommvdcmm iccmicc, amid imccecis
test, Mavmme wemmt scmfar as tim say ttmat lmccr results “do mmot relate tca
increased sccr’meccs carccliiveniemmee ---‘ ‘See N-I av,me, ‘‘Coimiparatis-e
Shmdv,”
1
m. 157. Ifshe ‘las rmcfem-ring 1cm tIme Federal Rese,’ve Board’s
immterpretadicmmm cii time pmmlmlieimiterest, Omen sIme ‘vas tcmo eim’emummspeet,
d)mm tIme otlmer Ima,mci, Jaeksc;mm am’ccrrmcdh timat ii imlchmmg eomnpamiv aeciuisi—
micmns cmf “weil—mmmammaged” Imammks imrcmmmmise “few public bemmefits, “ Sec
Iaekscmmm, “N-i mmitih-aimk Hc,iciimmg Cummmpammies” p - 26’
Des
1
mite timccmr ‘i’m mviiliogmi ess mm mmmake pohev rccc’omimmmmc’m iciatiunms,
time autImcmrs of mmem-fcmrmmmmumc’e sdimches appam-emmtiy have arm implicit
sdam,ciard fkmr deciding wimetlmer hammk bcildimig eommmpammiccs are hemme—
fieiai, Fcmr exanmmmlcc, Rciscc amid Sccmtd dlescrilmeda tmigimer raticm c;fcttier
expemmses tci noel assets amcmommg imcmldimsg ccmnmjmammv hamiks as ‘‘aiarnm—
8mg’’ ann-I a icmssm’r m’aticm cmifarmsi real estate icmamms tcm total assits amummg
lmm;ldimmg comupammy Imammks a’s-mi”cieficiemicv. “ See Pc’tccr 5, Rosc’ arid
Wiiliamim L- Secmtt, “TImcc Pem’fkmrmnanmee cmihianmks Acquired iv I lemldimig
Commmpamiies,” Recieic of Busimmem-s nod Eco,moomic Re-sec,iclm (Sprimmg
1979), pta- 29 amid 31, ,AiI time pccm’furmimammee studies refer to ‘‘hammk
pem’fcmrmimauce-”’Fhe tem’mmm immiplies am, objective or smmlmjective stamm—
diarci fir ciistiimgmuclm im mg supem’icmr fm’ommm immfccricir pccd’ormimamsc-e -
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Table 1
Empirical Results of Performance Studies
Univariate Studies Multivariate Studies
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Indicates that tie hnanc.ai ratmo was /ower for holdmnq company banks ceterms parmb1s
‘The four fmnancmal ratmos mndmcamed as smgn:tmcant were the ‘ndepender.t var.ables mu a n’umt,pledmscrmm.nant ana ysms that compared
mndependent and hold ng corroary banks Jour yeats after the latter were acqumred oy homomng companmes tm’The reported results refer to tie coefmmcment of the l’o’dmng company dummy varmabme In adnmtion. am’ .nteractmor var abme between
concentratmon ano the dummy varmable was posmt:ve and starmstmcally smgnmf’cant mn the equammon tar meal estate moans total assets aria negammve
for busmness oans’totar assets and capmtal total assels 3Mayne estimated equatmons tar cachet the tour years 1 969--72 Tie resm_;ts are reported here as smgnmfmcant ml the dummy varmable she usea
entered an equatmon smgnmficantly ‘n at least two ot the tou’ years tmThe reported results reter to tne ooeftmcment of toe ho’dmrmg company dumrry varmable In adomt,on, smx different mnteractmon varmables mnvomvmng
the oumrny varmabme were statmstmcamly smpnmfmcant In at least one of the authors 13 equatmors In three equatmons. two ot the nteraclmon
varmables were statmstmcai:y smgnmhcant. arid ‘n five equatior’s. ore of the mnteraetmen varmables was statmsfmcally smgnmtmcaflt
‘In the t-tests of dmfferences !n the means homd’ng company banmis were tounoto have had a higher ratmo of other eperaimng expenses to total
assets n the secormd year followmng acau’smtmon by a ‘ioldmng company, hut a ower ratio mn the thud year
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pammies Ofl the post—ac’cutmisitiomm pem’fom’mmiamice of subsici—
jam’s- imamiks. 10 1mm attemnpting tcm ecmntrol ftmrthe immilsieflee
cmi cmthem’ factors cm pc’s’fcmnmmamic’e, these stsmdlies pairc’d
hcmlclimmg ecmummlmanv banks with simmmilai’lv—sizc’dl indepems—
dent bammks frcmmn the sammme mmmam’ket. These sttmclies failed
to aclequateli- c’cmmmtrcml hmm’ imauk size and market eima,’ac’—
teristies, ammd high c’cmm’reiaticmns anmommg fimmaueial van—
aimies mmmade smmmivariate tests of statistical sigimificance
mmnintem’pretaimle, ~ Time umiivai’iatc, studies alscm eamm Ime
criticized forehmmminating fm’cmimm fimrtlmer studs’Imamiks timat
ccmumld mmot Ime suitably paum’edl.
Mcmst recemit pem’fcmm’nmanee st,mdhles have used multi—
vanate statis Neal teclmmmiqmmes, primmeipalls’ multiple—
regressiomm analysis, 12 Ummti receimtlv. the multiple—
regressicmn mmmodels were simmgle—eqtmatiomi mcmdels
svlueh w-’ere c’stimmmatecl using cmrdimmarv least squares
regressicmmm ammalvsis. Tlm:se mncmdels ecmmmmpam’eci pem’for—
inamsee at a ~mcmimmt 1mm timne, rather thamm cmv’er a pcmst—
ac’c~tmisition pericmd. The effect of lmcmlding companies cmii
imammk perfcmrmasmee was estlimmated 1w immelcmding a dmmmn—
mmmvvanaimlerepresenting hcmlding eomnpanv owuerslmim.
Some studies also included immteractioim vanalmles, 13
Time mnultiv’arjate studies imave several weaknesses.
First, mmmost oftlmemmm presumed that perfcmrmnance differ—
11
’Rciimert J Iaswrc’mmce- i/nc’ Prrfcmnmnain-’d f Bauk !-Ic’lc/iog (7cm mn—
mc’,s Rimam-ci ofCcmver,i (mrs cmftli c’ Fedc’i-al Rcsc, ‘se Svs teumi, i 967i;
S mcmiiusc’l II - TalIcy, i’lme EJfedt cmf IIolc/ioiz (7Oimi/iO cm p A~qoi,siticm mm-s
mmmi Bank Pec’fcm,-ncciode, S tall’E-omm, music S tsmclic’s 69 tbcmam-d of Gimy—
er,iors cmf time Fc’cie,-al Rc’se,-vc’ Svmtm‘iii. 19711; Rciimc’rt F - Warc’,
‘‘hk’rhmr mimamicc’ cmi Ham mks ,\c’m I ‘~ mcdl in Nm Idi —Bmcmmk hioi di mm g 1km, u —
pa’mic’s i mm Oh icm, ‘‘ F’c’ci erai Hese,-ve Bank of Clc’vehammdi Lddmocnmm id
Rc’eiew iNiarc-lm—,-\pril i973). pp 19—28: amid Stm,art C. licmli,mmamm_
‘‘‘i’Ime I mmmpact mif Hcud i’mg (‘kim mqm;mm m AlE hiadiomm cimm t3amm k Pei-fcmr—
mu ammce’,A Cace Studiv cmf ‘t’wca Flcmricia NI uitibamik iLoidm mmg Ccmmmi—
pammic;s” (Wcmrkiog FaimerSeries, Federal ReserveBank cml’ Atiammta,
jami nary 1976),
Rcmdmic’v I) - J mmii nm so,i am mdl l)avici B - NI Umcstc’r , ‘‘Aim Aim alvs is cml Bamik
HoLi ing Ccmmmm mmmi, iv Ac’mliiisit4cm, is: Som ‘me Nieti mciclcilcigicmci Ismmmcc -
Journal of Bank Rcs’eac-dn (Sprimig i973). immm 58—61.
m
Rcid mmcv 1), Jcmh mm scum amici i)mmvidl R.Ntc’ iimster, ‘“flm e Pem’fcmm’mnammce of
Bmmmmk Uoichmmg Cmm,rmpam iv Aemiuisiticu,m5; A NI ,mitivar,mmtc’ Ammmcivs is,
Jcmi, c’,mal ofBusi,ce,s,s (Aimm’i I 1 9751, I~P204—12: jmmcksci mm’ -‘Ni mm] tihmmmmk
H mmldimmg Coimmimami ‘es;’ ,-~m-t
1
m cmr ( , Fm-mcas, T/me Pc rfo non mmcc of/mic/i—
<:4th, a/B a ink holding Ccm cc/un flies, Stall Ecciimom uic Stmmcl mel 84
(Bcmam-cl cif Covcrimcmrs cuf timc’ Federal Reserve Systeum, 1974):
NIi nmgmm, ‘‘NI ammmmgcri ci N-i cm tivc,s, Ni ;crket Structures - mmm,d lmc_rfdir_
mmmamiee,’’ imP ‘411—21: Ni avmme, “Coiiqmam-ative Sdcmcly, nm 147—58;
Rcmse mu mci Scott. -‘Pc, normmmmumcc’ cml Ba,iks, ‘‘ imp - I 8—37; ;cmmd 1) umc,me B,
Cm’adciv arid Remmlmcmm Kyim’, Ii I, ‘‘Affiliated Bmcmmk Pem-formmmammce amid
time Simn cm itammeitv cif Fi‘maimcimmi I )c’ci siomm — Niakii mg ‘‘ Jcmi, coal of P4—
mb Odd (Seimtcmmmber1980), Imim- 951—57. Jcmlmmmscmcm amid Nleiimsder used
cmmimitiple—clmsenimmmioaut ammmclvsis’; tlmc’ otimers mmmcd mmioitiimie—
regrcssiomm ammalvsis,
mm
These ssem-e time stndic,s in- Ntimmgo, amid Cm-adidiv -mmmci Kyle. SeeIbid.
Thc, i’m termccticmmm variabies sverc, umrochic;ts cmf tIm e cino, mmmv variable
amid calmer immde
1
mcnmdemmt variables, Tlmey tested time hypothesis that
aim iimdceimenciem,t variable’s eflkrct mum imammk lmcrionimimumde depeimcleci
omi dime himcmmk’s fcmrmn of cmwnershmiim.
emic’esat a lmoint imm timne were due tcm c’hammges in per—
fornmanc’e after the aequisiticmn. Sec’cmd, some studies
eosmtintmed tcm pair iimdepenclent and holclimig conmpanv
lmauks. U 4 Third, ingim msmltiecmllirsearitv ins’olvimmg in—
teraeticmn vam’ialiles mmmav Imave Imiased time ecmeffieient esti—
mates, Finally, single—equatioim mmmodels igmcore immtem’—
clependeimec, anmcmmmg lmank decisicmns, l,m
Cradd~’and Kyle attein1mted tcm acc’cmtmnt fkmm’ inter—
depenclemmcies anmomig finamieial raticms lmv estimmmating aim
ad hoe system of 13 equatiomms, Althouglm it was an
nmpm’ov’emmmentover earlier models, thmeir uncmdel did not
c:a~mturethe hsvpcmthc’sized complexity cmf tile inter—
depemmdeneeamong Imank decisicmmms; furtherumom’e, their
mterlmretation cmf eertaimm fimmammcial raticms was
cjuesticmnaimle, mm~
Dts-tortio-n,s’ in Financial Rat-ics
Specific distortions iim the financial raticms can Ime
traced to the nature mftime Imanking flrmmi amaci time Imank
hcmldumg c’ompaimv, ammd tcm the eflec’t cmi regulatiocm 0mm
Imank prices. Banks sell maims’ different prodsmc’ts amid
acquire mnammy differenìt chepcmsit lialmilities. Revens,es
and expenses depend osm imortfkmhio eonuimcmsitiomm, amid
prices de1mench cmii the size, type and risk cmf the assets
ammd liabilities in time portlohnm. Bank lnmlding ecmmpaimics
are vertically acid horizcmmmndlv integrated corpcmrations,
This fkmrmn oforganization pcmtentialiy affords real advan-
tages, but alscmcm’eates aeecmtinting difierences between
imidependent and stmlmsidiarv lmammks. i)eposit ceilings
place a stattmtcmrv limit cmn tIme imriee cmf certain kimmcis cmf
ciepcmsits, eausimmg lmammks tcm emmgage 1mm miomm—lmriee comn—
petiticun for loanalmle finds.
P-rohirerns- with Ratios as 3-learnres of P-ace — Per-
Icmrmnance studhies represeimt the prices tbcat lmaimks
tm
Tim c-sc’ wem’c, thmc’ ammclicc lmv J ol musomi mc,mci NIci mistc-’r, ammd N iavmcc’- See
him/cl- Time (‘murumc’r mittidy -act mmmcl Iv us cci mc sammm]mlc’ cmf imanks fl-cm, u




Duansc’ B, Cradcly amici Reolmemm Kyle, HI, “Timc’ Si ,mmmmitammeity cii
Bamik Dcc:icicmo-Ni;ckimmg, Market Struct tire, amid Bank FerlUr-
mama-c, “far,coal ofFirnande (Niarcim 1979), imim- 1—18, ‘him/s imiterde-
umecicienuce camcses time hmgim c’currelaticuims immmmcmmmg fimmammcial m’atios
outed earher b’, Jobuso’, ammdl N-Iccii,ster - ‘Flmc’ mime cmfsin gice c-eq m mactim
regression cuodc,is ummder dimcse cirecmmmmst;umccs i,mtrc,dcmces simmmuil—
tamieous equaticimm Imias into time ordimmar> iceast sqmmares estimnates of
time regressicmmm coelficie,cts, Note that this eriticismmm does mmcmd per-
tain to time Jcuhmmccumm mmmcl N-iduster study, iu whmicim flmmanmciaI m’aticms
entered only as iimdepemmdemmt variaimies in mm mmmuIdiple—discrimmminammt
ammalysis.
i<)Tlmc, am ithors- cimcmiee cif fimmmimic/al rmmticms tc rceprcescmm t iii ~ and
cucmtimmit decisicmmcs led timcqmm tcu i’m tc nmmret cert;ci,i raticm,s ccc c~uami t i tic’s-
For exmimim jmle, tIme mactic mu cml tcutmcl ioamms tcm tcmtal assets, mmmmcl salaries
mcmmd wages to tmmtal mcssc’ts. “c-nc- ii, tcenimreted mcs quamctitic-s cii nummtimcit




mretatiomm cuftlmc, m-aticu cuf
total cmcpitmml to tcmdal risk mcssc,ts as time imamik’s iemcdimig hmint is
clcmcmiutftml. Sec Timid,, mmmm. 7—8,
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charge for their products and pay for deposits as ratios
of income statement items to balance sheet items. For
example, the price paid for deposits has imeen inca-
stmred by the ratio of immterest paid cmn deposits to total
time and savings deposits, and thce priceof loans lmv the
ratio ofintem’est received cmii loaims to the lcman portfolio.
There -are four reasons that these financial ratios are
iuiadec~uateproxies for such prices.
Fiist, the ratios do mmcmt accouimt for a Imank’s portfolio
ccmmpcmsition. The sizes audI types ofa banks loans or
deposits affect its operating costs and, hence, time
prices the hank lmoth imays and charges, These effects
are not captured by the ratios cmfincome statement to
balance sheet items. Such ratios are aetsmallv weighted
averages of many different prices; they measure aver-
agerevenues and averagc-m expenses rather thaim prices.
Second. the raticms include risk premniucns. Bammks can
Ime expected tcm charge higher rates cmf interest cmms loans
with greater perceived diefault risk. Banks that choose
tcm mnake riskier loans will tend to have higher average
revenue from loans (and also more lmad delmts),
although they may charge the same mate as other banks
for loans of ccmcn1marahmle clef-suit risk. Interest rate risk
increaseswith the maturity cmfloans. Banks that ehcmose
to make longer—term lcmans also will tend to havehigher
average revenue frocn loans.
Third, the raticms fail hmaceoumm tfor the effects ofprice
ceihismgs on scmmne deposits. \-Vheim the legal rate cml in-
tereston de1mosits is fixed lmelosvthe inam’ket rate, hmanks
have an incentiv’c-, tcu incur imoim—immterest expenses tcm
attract de1mosits. These additicmmmai ccmsts are ncmteountedl
asinterest expense on a lmanksincome statement, Ccmn-
sequemitly, the average expense raticm ucicierstates the
true cost cmfdeposits. This understatement is ~mrolmalmly
greater for scmune Imamiks timamm fcur cmthers, depending cmn
the dc,mancl amid supply conchticmns for deposits imi chf—
feremit Imanking markets.
Fourth,, time ratios fail tcm account for ismterdependen—
cies among certain prices. Some lmanking services are
purchased in a package, f’cmr example, a lmcmrrovs’er’s
agreesnent to maintain a ccmmpensatiimg imalacmee with
the lending Imank in returim for a lowcmr ncmmninal rate mf
( raclclv aim ch K>-Ic clid act-on‘it fmur c’ei’taimm aspects cml imcmntfcml icu ccmmri —
Imcusi timuu - Tim cmi n eqoat hum m hun the average i mi tc’m’c’st mactm’ cumm Iiumsmi c -
i mid-I ucicci acu mmngm mmmerits the raticms of iuusiimcsu, real estate - amid
installmsmeimt lcmmcmms tcu tcital assets- Their c-qmmaticumm fcmn time aye m’msge
clc-4mcmsit ran’ immc:lsmcimcl am am-gummmmcmi its the rmmticms cul dIce cmiamici clcmmmcmsi ts
tcm trut mci cle-
1
mosits ammcl sam’-iugs dc-
1





mosits - See Ibid - - mm 9, Thcesc’ simc-cificatimmius acre an iii, imrcuvdmms mcmm
om’cmr timcmse cifcutlmcmr mmcm nib,‘imiaimccm st mmcli C’s; m mcvc’rthcmlesu, times’ Liii tcm
mmcccii mm ct fmmn mrmamm v mcslmects cml jmcuntftuiicu ccii ojmcmsiticuim- hit’1 cmdhimmgsize
chlk’rm-mmcc’s ‘vithiii mcmi>- cmmtegcun- cif lcuamm u cur dc imcmsiis-
interest on a loan. The true interest rate depends on
the size of the compensating balance; however, the
ratio measuring average loan revenuedepends only on
nomimial rates.
Different average revenue and expense ratios are
nmt necessarily dice tm different prices for a standard
1mroduet. Systematic diffem-enees in portfolio compo-
sition, risk or cmther hmusiness strategies Imetween mdc-
imendent banks and holding eosn~manylmanks cause
systematic differeimees in the average revenue and ex-
pense ratios. The ratios are ambiguous guides tcm the
prices lmanks charge forproducts acid pay for deposits.
Probleums with Ratios- a-s I-lear-ares- of.Lffacieac-mj---—-In
performance studies, the term ‘efficiency” is used tcm
deserilmethe relationship lmetweemm bmaimk costs amid some
measure cmf cmutput, generally total assets hmut cmcea—
sionallv total revenue. The relaticmnship bmetween tcmtal
costs and cmutptct is cmieasured lmy- the ratio of cmperating
expemcses tcm total assets cmr total revenue; the rdmla—
tionship hmetweemm two particular elements oftotal cost
is measured hmv the ratios ofsalaries and wagesexpense
to total assets and other operating expenses to tcmtal
assets. Smallervalues cmfthese raticms are interpreted as
evidenceoflower ccmst (i.e., snore efficient) 1mrodueticun.
This interpretathmn is invalid.
Bammks are multiprcmduet firimis that olmtain ftuidsfrom
a variety cmlsources. Scmme imamikimmg prcmcluets and scmme
sources cmfftmnds are more ecmstlv than cmthiers; therefore,
the operatimsg expemise raticms ciepemid cm the ecmimmpcmsi—
tion of a Imank’s 1mortfcmlic. iresunmaimly, nmore costly
portfolios yieldl higher revenues, so time raticm cmfcmperat—
ing revemsue to total assets depends-as well on imortfolum
commipcmsiticmn. Because opem-atimig reventme also clepc-ends
mmi the control time bank exercises over 1mrice, nc ratio
incorporating operatimig reveimue is aim adequate proxy
fcmr a bamik’s cost cmf prcmdueticmcm.
Baimk lmculding coumpanies are s’erticallv imitegratc,cl
curganizations; the pareimt comnpany prcmvicles a variety
ofsers’ices tcm its sulusidiarv bammks, 1cm sonic cases, thc’se
services hmavcm beemm cemitm’alized in time hcmldling ccmmnpanv
as au ecomiomny measure. Incuther eases, the salmcries cmf
scmumce bank emplcmyees mime assigmmed arlmitrarily tm the
imam’ent compasis-’ instead of the subsidliary. In either
dmase, the salaries cuf scmmne esnployees who provide ser-
vices to a subsidiary- bank arc ears’ided omi the lxmoks cmi
the hcmldimig eonipamiy instead cm1 the hank itself. This
ismtm’cmciuces a sy-stcemnatic clowmmward Imias iimto the re-
ported salaridms andwages eximense cmfhmldiugccmmnlmany
imanks and, thus, a dlownward Imias intcm the salaries and
wages expense raticm of hcmlding c’cmumpamms’ lmanks.
32FEDERALRESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1983
Somne hank activities mire more lahmor—intemmsiye than
otimers. Ccmnsequently. the salaries and wages expense
ratio may vary systematically between holding coin-
pamiy’ banks and independent hmanks due tcm differences
in portfolio eosmmposition. This source cmfclistortiomm niay
reinforce or cmffset the dcmwnwardl bias discscssed in the
preceding paragra~mh.
Bank holdimmg companies usccallv charge their sub—
sidiaries for services provided imy the parent ecmcnpm-iny.
fhc’sdm charges, which are internal accounting trans—
fors, mire referred to as mnauagemmiesmt fees. As the ‘‘cmther
cmperating expeumse” category on a hmam,k’s incomne state—
nient includes management fees, this exlmesmseis hmiased
tipward if hcmlding comnpammies charge their suhmsidiarv
imanks fcmr services provided.
Probleams cith Pete-rage as a Meas-a-re of Capita-i
itderpcaemj or Risk — Leverage is the ratio of delmt to
capital. A hmank’s levem-age inns’ i-efleet the attitudes of
owsiers or managers toward risk; it may Ime related to
cmther factors as well. Perforsnance studies have ad-
vancedl cmne reason that holding compasmy imanks should
lie less highly leveraged amid asmother that they’ shouhdl
he more highly leveraged, irrespective of attitudes
towardl risk.
Sommme performance studies have argued that Imank
holdimmg comimanies have greater access to capital niar—
kets than indepemmdent banks. As thisadvantage should
translate imitcu a lcmwer ccmst cmfcapital, banks owned lmv
bmoldimmgcompanies shcnmld holdl mncmm’e capital iii relatiosm
ttm delmt than independent hmanks. On the cmther hand,
holding companies also are bmetter aimle than indejmeu—
dent imamiks tc cliv’ersifv gecmgraphically. TS Other Imer—
fimrmance studlies have argued that gecmgraphically
diversified holdimig companies reduce their risk imy
lessening their dependence omm any single geographic
area. With, this advantage, they shmcmulcl reqtcire less
capital for any given level of debt. Bcmth argtmments
have been tmsed to rationalize empirical results. Be-
cause the arguinemmts dm miot ummambigudmusly predict the
efl’ect ofhmauk hcmlding companies on time ratioofdebt to
capital, leverage cneasicres neither capital adequacy
ncmr risk.
Ussnuk hcmldimmg comsmpammies (macmm own mmciii—hamik snbsidhiaricms imm mmmiv
state, wlmereas Imanks are limited Imy state turammeiming restrictioums -
Banks caimnot icmcatccuffices lim states cmtimer tliamm their hcmmmmc states,
amid in socmme states are himnited to ccmudocting all or mimost of their
lmccsimiess fromi, a single office, 1mm states that restrict imrammchmiumg,
mnmuitiimmank holdiusg comimpamiies camu circummmvemmt legalrestrictions 0mm
the geognaphicah extent of a imank’s operation by acquiring cmr
chartering imanks iii chifereot areas of time state, Thus, to scume
extent they are suimstitutes for Imrammch banks,
Gem-tam accounting ccmnveutions cmhscure any coun—
parison of the capital of holding company banks and
independent imanks. I--Ioldimig cosnpamiies cami borrow
fiurmds to augmnesit the reported capital oftheir subsid-
iam-y imanks. (This practice is known as doulmle leverag-
ing.) For accounting purposes, the funds are capital to
the hmasik and debt to the holding company; therefore,
the effectofthe hmorrcmwing is tcm increase theleverage ci
the parent ccmmmipan~amid decrease the leverage of the
subsidiary Imank.
Does douimle leveraging improve the capital position
ofthe hmam,k? To put the questicmmi differently, is a imamik
that lmcmrrcmws through its parent hicmlding company
actually expmsed to less risk thiami aim independent Imank
that incurs time same deht itself? The answer depemids
ultimately on whether a suimsidiary Imank is insulated
from the financial proimlenis cmf its parent company- On
one hand, the Imank is a separate legal entity; the hold-
ing compamiy is prohihmited legally from draining the
batik cf its assets or capital. 0mm time other hand, the
operating policies of the imamik are dictated b the
parent company; if faced with insolvency, time holding
conipany is likelytc operate timeimasik in a risky manner
in an attempt to meet the im,terest ~maymnents on its
debt. It seems that the practice of double leveraging
obscures time distinction between delmt amid calmital,
causing an overstatesmient of time capital jmcmsitious of
sulmsidiarv’ hmauks arid an understatement of risk.
Prohle-ri-as- witlm Rat-ios as iclensa-c of Po-rtfotio Com-
position — Several portfolio raticms are used in 1merfcmr—
niance studies. They measscme time prcmpom-ticmns of tcmtal
assets heIdi as Iciamis, cash, TI. S. goversmsnent securities
amid so forth, amid the proporticmmis cmf the loan portf’cmlio
dcvcmted to cliffem’ent kisids of loans, such as hmusiness,
real estate audi installmneumt loamms. Differences in port-
folio mmmix mire partly respcmnsilmle lcmr the hmiases iii tither
fimiancial ratios.
The portfolio ratios are less subject to potential dis—
tortioum than cmther fimiancial raticms. Nevertheless. cer—
tam portfolio ratios mnaybe biased due to the dlivisiomi of
a bank hcmlding cocnpany iuito bank audi ncmmi—bank sub-
sidiaries. This divisiomi creates reporting differences
between holding company amid independent banks.
For examnple, a mortgage loan by an independent bank
wcmnld he reported on the bank’s call report, but the
same loan imy a holding company’smortgage subsidiary
would appear on the Imooks ofthe non-bank subsidiary.
Although non-bank subsidiaries account for a small
proportion of total holding con)pany activities, time
legal and accounting divisions may distort particular
portfolio ratios, such as the raticm of realestate loans to
total loans.
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The portfolio ratios do not indicate imuambiguously
the extent oflending to the local community. A higher
ratio ofloans to totalassets is ncmt necessarily evidence
of greater local lending, because some loans on the
bank’s hmomks may mepresent loan participations or
purchased paper.
CONCLUSION
The financial ratios used in bank perf’orsnaneestud-
ies are subject tm substantial distortiomi when used to
assess the impact cmf bank holding comnpanies on bank
imerformnam,ce. These distortions are attributable to the
nature of the banking firru amid the hank holding con,-
pammy orgamzation, and to the efl’ect of reguiatiosi (mu
deposit interest rates. As a result, time performnance
stscdies generally have not provided reliable evidemmce
about the effect ofhank holding companies on either
hank perfimrmnance or the factors that the Board of
Governors imas idleuitified as prosimective beueflts of
holding compamiy acquisitiosis.
Previous investigations have found that the Board cmf
Governors has not given much weight to convenience
and needs. The finding that orders approving hank
holding company acquisitiomms ‘‘seldom,’, dwelt’’ omi the
benefits (mf time case when an acdluisitiomi had an unim—
portant competitive effect, and the slight weight given
prospective benefits in orders of denial seem to sup-
port this conclusion. ~ This is cormsistent with time re—
stilts of past performnance studies, which usually have
attriimutedoimly small effects to holdingcompanies, amid
often have contradicted each other at that.
There is no evidence that the Board bias relied omi
either financial ratios or the results of performance
studies in reaching its decisions. The assessment mnade
in this-article indicates that it should use neither.
Although the shcmrtcomiugs of previous empirical
aimproaches eveutuallv may lie overcome, time imroim—
lems with using fimiancial ratios to measure either per-
formance or the public interest aimpear intractable.
Perforunancestudies are not withoutpotential value,
however. Ifproperlydesigned, the studiescan identify
differences between the reported operating m’esuhts of
independent banks amid holding companybanks. These
differencesunay suggest directions forresearch into the
incentives for hasik holding comnpamiy fimrn’mation amid
growth. But they are not likely to provide useful evi-
dence of the desirability of imamik holding comnpany
acquisitidmmis.
lessee amid Sceehig. ‘‘,Ammaiysis cuf Pcmlmlic Bcmmelits Test.” mw t61—62,
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